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Introduction 
This paper is written on the invitation of the organizers of the 
International Colloquium on New Directions for Development Planning in 
[Mixed] Market Economies, and relates to the second session (5.b) "The 
main methodological challenges of planning". I have not yet seen other 
papers to the Colloquium. Since my knowledge about Latin America and 
the Caribbean is rather unspecific, I have based this discussion paper 
mainly on experience gathered in a different setting, namely some years 
of research into planning theory and then a decade as head of the 
Swedish Secretariat for Future Studies. I hope that at least some of 
the points may be useful to our discussions in Santiago in August. 
The functions of planning 
"If planning is everything, maybe 
it^s nothing" (Aaron Wildawsky) 
1. Planning is basically preparing for decision. Decisions of any 
significance are based on power. Hence planning is part of the 
exercise of power in society. No methodology or philosophy of planning 
should be allowed to hide this fact. It is widely recognized in the 
social sciences that societal functions, such as planning, can not 
stray far off what is acceptable to those holding power, if it should 
remain "relevant". Planning for desirable social change may well be 
important, but is by necessity severely limited as a tool for such 
change. But the margin might still be wide enough to make the effort 
worth while! 
*/ The views expressed in this work are the sole responsibility 
of the author and do not necessarily coincide with those of 
the Organization. 
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2. Long-range planning is part of the excercise of power over the 
future. This has methodological implications, e. go as the use of 
systematic futures studies and the relativization, of some economic 
variables, such as GNP growth. The longer time frame also has some 
ethical implications, separate from those pertaining to planning or 
decision-making in general» Also, the normative element in planning 
becomes clear, and the question of willed social change comes to the 
forefront. If it is not taken seriously the function of long-range 
planning may simply be to make "all that what is wrong, more consis-
tently wrong". 
3. In planning mental images held by decision-makers and planners are 
more important than specific methodologies. They guide the process of 
working out plans, including prognostication and scenario building. 
Such mental images are essentially of two kinds: mental heritages from 
past experience, and images of the future. In "unproblematic" times 
those images are mostly implicit, and moreover the picture of the 
future seems to conform nicely to the experiences from the past. In 
terms of crisis the opposite holds. History as well as future appears 
as controversial and sometimes threatening. In such times in par-
ticular it becomes an important function of long-range planning and 
futures studies to make explicit those two sets of images, ana cha-
llenge them by presenting alternative structuring of known facts, new 
facts and non-standard courses of scflon. 
4. This should not be taken to mean that planning should only have a 
dialectical and critical function in regard to the political system (in 
the broadest possible sense). Any planning process, be it for a firm, a 
nation or a whole region, has to find out and define what kind of 
problematique it really has to address. Experience shows that the most 
important function of planning in retrospect has often been the effort 
to sort out the "basic issues" from all other preoccupations. 
5. The "longer" time frame implies an intellectual challenge. By 
focussing on the future one is lead to face more fundamental and 
strategic questions than is common in politics or administration. For 
the intellectual, this is a chance to bring in basic theoretical 
questions from the social sciences, history and philosophy and to put 
the day-to-day events into a broader perspective. It also relieves the 
researcher from the tediousness of empirical data, as well as from 
adherence to strict disciplinary boundaries. For once, one is allowed 
to explore "the great paradigms which seek to explain the social 
dynamic". Experience shows that this, to a large degree, is a useful 
stimulus to social science as well as to the serious political debate: 
"developing and applying knowledge and intelligence in our affairs" 
(Barnard). 
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6. On the other hand, it will also contain a political temptation. 
Considerations built on the longer time frame will always have dif-
ficulty making an impact in the day-to-day practice of politics. The 
limitations in handling capacity are felt everywhere. But when 
"future" issues are taken up explicitely, the political apparatus may 
be tempted to regard those considerations as delegated to "planners", 
future studies organizations or the like, instead of integrating them 
at least to some extent into it^s own thinking. 
7. I suggest the use of a basic conceptual model for the discussion 
of planning problems. It contains first the identification of three 
elements: a planning subject which is the person or organization that 
plans, a planning object which is what the planning is directed at, and 
then the environment, denoting everything that can not be planned for 
but has importance for the planning object and for the problematique 
with which the planning concerns itself. It will be used to structure 
some of the reflections on development planning that follow. 
Planning and market 
8. The superposition of the two terms planning and market economy (in 
particular if the latter is taken to mean that "economic decisions are 
decentralized") seem at first glance to be logically contradictory. 
This is of course not quite so: all known contemporary economies are 
"mixed" to some extent and contain elements of (central) planning. But 
the question is indeed problematic and ideologically controversial, as 
I am sure the Colloquium will recognize in it^s discussions. If one 
think of planning as primarily having to do with "public policies" the 
experience from advanced mixed economies leads one to identify three 
types of interrelations between planning and the market: 
A. Counter-market ; mainly interventions directed at redis-
tribution, cutting of profits, rules for localization, environmental 
restrictions, increased employment, worker^s protection etc. 
B. Pro-market; interventions intended to restore a more ideal 
market: so to say clean the table for a fair game (example: anti—trust 
legislation). At times one practices a more advanced form of this, 
namely to speed up the process of the market forces in the direction 
they are supposed to lead us (example government research subsidies). 
C. Management of activities in the public sector, hence outside 
the market and in principle already under political control. 
A 
There is of course no way to neatly group various policies into 
one or the other category; in monetary policy for instance A and B 
tend to appear in some mixture, and in fiscal policy all three. 
Transportation subsidies can be either or both, and so on. Inter-
ventions of type A are often legitimized by claiming that they are 
really B, pro-market, in the longer run. On the other hand it is 
quite frequent that actors who support "in principle" an ideal, free 
market argue for A-interventionist policies in favor of special 
interests. 
9. From a methodological point of view, however, the distinction is 
an important one. The richest experience of planning in the public 
policy domain refers to type C: "sectors" like defence, education, 
social services, transportation, etc. This has two reasons. Firstly, 
in these fields the similarities are considerable with the private 
company, which by a long shot is the kind of unit most "planned for" 
and whose planning problems have been widely elaborated in the litera-
ture. Secondly, in spite of political uncertainties and prognos-
tication problems, it is far easier to "decide in advance" in those 
areas than it is for the country or the economy at large. This has led 
to a situation where many planning methodologies, sometimes without 
explicitely recognizing it, refer to such mainly controllable planning 
objects. 
10. The real question of planning for development is far more dif-
ficult: even methodologically. What is the planning object? Certainly 
not only the state or the public sector. The planning object could 
preferably be described as a multiorganization, whose major components 
in addition to the political organs proper are private companies (large 
and small), associations of firms, labour unions, popular movements, 
the burocracy and the intelligentsia. The strength and importance of 
these various actors vary of course from country to country. Con-
flicts, more or less fundamental, exist between them. The question of 
how to "plan" for a reasonable development of such a multiorganization 
has been solved in many different ways in mixed economies: 
reflected in such different schemes as Le Plan in France, the three-
modal planning structure in the Netherlands and the indicative, mainly 
economic, planning in my own country, Sweden. In all three mentioned, 
one has also felt the need to organize futures studies with a broader 
scope, but with correspondingly looser ties with real decision-making. 
In a mixed economy intervention from the "management" has to be more 
limited than in a firm or an office. In many cases it is also politi-
cally sensitive. These facts can not be separated from "methodologies" 
for planning, nor from what I described as the "probleraatique" above. 
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11. In many countries (development) planning has come to be identified 
with the elaboration of econometric models of the economy, and pro-
jecting the development some years (3, 5, sometimes more) into the 
future. Many providers of development assistance —'beginning with the 
US and the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after 1945— 
require that the recipients establish this kind of planning models. 
The indicative value of such models shall not be denied. They evi-
dently go some way towards solving the dilemma of the government 
outlined in p.10. However, as a tool for truly long-range, development 
planning, such models are very limited and to some extent also mislea-
ding (see pp. 13-16,20). 
Beyond "the economy" 
12. The question "what is the planning object?" can also be answered: 
the economy. However, it is not at all trivial what one should mean by 
economy in a development perspective. In addition, the analysis should 
include economic and social factors. Even if one assumes that the 
economy is a basic determinant of social development, the concep-
tualization of economic factors in the long run becomes highly critical 
for the type of social issues that can be recognized and analyzed. 
13. Again, three levels of delimitation can be distinguished. I will 
call them respectively the elite, the formal and the total economies. 
A leading value for most national economies has for several decades 
been "export-led growth" (The Latin American countries have histo-
rically, since colonial times, been marked by a very clear export 
dependence, at certain times far too pronounced). It is natural that 
this mental heritage still plays a very strong part in thinking about 
development. Methodologically this is reflected in strong emphasis on 
the "elite", or "modern" part of the economy and it^s growth potential. 
Econometric models and formally registered GNP growth tends to over-
estimate the over-all importance of the elite economy. 
14. Aside from the modeling and the statistics there seems to be a 
critical assumption tied to the emphasis on the elite economy, namely 
that through some "trickle-down" process a healthy growth in the 
elite economy also proportionally or somewhere near will raise the 
economic standards for the whole population. In the North-European 
debates on growth, proponents of this position have often retreated to 
the weaker statement that a higher standard for all is possible on a 
higher GNP level. In Latin America even this hypothesis seems to be 
unsupported by facts. Hence no simple and direct linkage could be 
assumed between the performance of the elite economy and more general 
social and economic goals. 
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15. However, inside the standard accounting and modelling procedures, 
the behavior of the full formal (=money-based) economy could in 
principle be taken into account. In European economies full accounting 
of the formal economy, observed either from the side of expenditures or 
from production, is normal practice. I can imagine that in some Latin 
American countries statistical reporting is not complete enough for a 
reliable account of e.g. small businesses, particularly in the country-
side. It seems clear, however, that descriptions of the full formal 
economy, in model-based form or otherwise, can give important infor-
mation on e.g. wage levels in the non-elite sectors and about the cost 
of living. 
16. An account of the economy, rich enough to allow analysis of 
changes in living standards for the whole population, must also include 
the informal (=unpaid) economy. It includes work done in households, 
subsistence farming, crafts, repairs and maintenance outside the 
market, and cooperative work e.g. at the village level. If we add this 
to the formal economy we arrive at the total economy. Some developing 
countries exhibit a very sharp duality in their economies —essentially 
between the elite sector and the rest of the economy— and in those 
eases the importance of the informal sector is readily recognized. 
However, the informal part of the economy does not wither away as 
"countries become more de velupeu or the G"P rises, —I-n—the indus-
trialized countries of Northern Europe, typically as much labor time is 
spent in informal work as in paid employment. This, however, holds on 
the aggregate level; the allocation of the total amount of work is an 
important indicator of life-styles and well-being of the population. 
(There is a tendency for a new duality to develop in some of the 
industrialized economies in Europe, coupled to growing mass unemploy-
ment. Hence dualization may turn out to be a companion not only to 
underdevelopment but to overdevelopment as well). 
17. For obvious reasons, the statistical reporting from the informal 
sector is widely inferior to that of the elite sector. Of course I am 
not suggesting that a full system of national statistics of, say, hours 
spent in various forms of informal work, be set up. One reason 
against is that such a scheme would be impractical, and in large 
measure impossible. Another has to do with ethics and the rights of 
the state: the point of informal work and informal exchange is exactly 
their property of being informal: unregulated and unregistered. 
Reporting requirements would in many cases be unnatural and in some 
actually destroy what they were supposed to measure. However, a basic 
knowledge about the informal economy in broader terms is necessary for 
reasonable planning. It has to be acquired through research on typical 
cases and important examples; some results can also be obtained by 
indirect means from known data. 
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Ethical dilemmas 
18. In long-range planning the time span frequently covers several 
generations. This puts the ethical question squarely: who is respon-
sible for what we leave —in terms of natural resources, environment, 
infrastructure, production capacity, etc.— to coming generations. 
The Swedish futures commission under Alva Myrdal^s chairmanship 
formulated an answer: "In our democratic society it is a task for the 
political bodies to represent the interests of coming generations". 
This may sound idealistic and/or unrealistic to some. What could not 
be avoided, however, is the ethical challenge of the question. Using a 
purely economistic methodology, some have claimed that a proper 
interest rate is the instrument to balance the (material, economic) 
claims of coming generations against those of us living to-day. This 
position does not stand for closer ethical analysis, when applied to 
such problems as depletion of natural resources or permanently using 
fertile land for other purposes. The dilemma remains, and some 
explicit ethical reflexion should in my view always accompany long 
range planning that affects coming generations. 
19. One might think that long range planning and reflexions about the 
future is something that one can choose to do —or not to do. This is 
of course so: there is no immediate need to plan ahead, and I also know 
of no constitution that requires the government to take the more 
distant future into account. But that does not mean that long-range 
problems do not exist. A mass of decisions, taken on all kinds of 
levels in the multiorganization that is the modern society, serve to 
create the future. It is like a zipper that gradually closes. Small 
decisions, adjustments, legislation and habits create and heritage so 
that later —when the standard future does not look so good any more, 
or when the initially promising course has led into an impasse— 
the nations finds itself zipped into something that feels more like a 
straight-jacket. There is, in my view, an ethical element even in 
this. Some organized thinking about the dilemmas that are created by 
the "terror of small decisions" should be the responsibility of every 
government. 
Methodology: concluding remarks 
20. Economic accounting and model-building will no doubt be a backbone 
in development planning even in the future. I have voice above my 
concern that this may lead to an overemphasis on the formal economy, 
and in particular the elite and export-oriented segments of it. One 
may go a step further and ask whether the exactness and the prestige of 
quantitative economic exercises may simply overstress the economic 
indicators of development, overshadowing other dimensions, that are 
often more difficult to quantify and measure. 
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21. Scenario-building has become an important tool for exploring 
long-range issues in many countries. Through broad descriptions of 
"future histories": a small number of qualitatively different alter-
natives, one can achieve an understanding that cuts across sectoral 
boundaries. Alternative course of action (and not only those elab-
orated in the study) can more easily come into the minds of decision-
makers. The planning context, in general a multiorganization 
(see p.10), makes it mandatory that planning takes the form of dialogue 
and negotiation. Scenarios have proved to play a clarifying and dis-
ciplining role in that process. Particularly such scenarios that 
contain a "hard core" of economic data or an economic model, but also 
include a broader set of variables, have turned out to be useful for 
understanding development problems. (A famous example from the modern 
literature is the Bariloche study Catastrophe or New Society? by A 
Herrera & al, 1977). 
22. There exists a multitude of future studies and long-range planning 
"methods", offered by consultancies, institutes and university groups. 
Taking the risk of sounding grossly unfair, I would like to issue a 
general warning against packaged, "over-the-counter" methodologies. 
The major reason for this lies in the hidden assumptions about "the 
nrnMpmaflnup" that are always built into ready-made models. Not until 
he is convinced that a specific methodology conforms reasonably well 
with the problems he would like to see explored, a decision-maker and 
his planner should subscribe to a certain methodology. This position 
—problem before method— is a subjective and disputed one, but I can 
argue for it from experience and from the open literature. 
On the problématique 
23. Approaching the problem, as we do here, from the side of planning 
methodologies, some critical factors having to do with the nature of 
the development process and it's goals emerge with particular clarity. 
I will take up three of them, very briefly. 
All development processes have two sides: the creation/mobili-
zation of resources, and the allocation/consumption/dist ribution of 
them. There are also (at least) two possible levels of analysis: macro 
and micro. If stress is laid on the macro level only, "growth" is 
conceived as a rather mechanical phenomenon, and the more interesting 
aspects of resource mobilization, particularly that of human labor, 
tend to get overlooked. In economies that show tendencies to duality, 
the micro aspects of mobilizing labor, land and other resources should 
be given particularly strong attention. 
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24. It is natural that transition theories of the kind that have been 
discussed in the US and Europe during the last decade should be taken 
into consideration; they are marked by terras like post-industrial 
society, service society, information society, self-service society an 
so on. In the first place one should again warn against mechanical 
application of observed statistical regularities. For certain groups 
of countries the rise of GNP is accompanied by a very clear shift of 
labor: first away from agriculture into industry and then from industry 
into services. The driving forces may well not be the same in the 
Latin American economies, and the theoretical assumptions on which the 
future projections of such developments are based are not necessarily 
fulfilled. For one thing most theories of transition assume that wage 
levels across the whole economy are comparable and move essentially in 
parallell. If this is not the case the whole picture will change. 
25. It is natural to believe that rather than describing a typical 
Latin American Economy in terms of one transition (such as "industrial" 
to "service") one should look at it as at least three transitions 
superimposed: from agricultural to industrial, from industrial goods to 
industrialized information and from goods to services, part of the 
latter in the "self-service" mode. In that way some of the important 
transition theories can be brought to use, without submitting to their 
extreme and unrealistic simplications. 



